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Using a sample of Chinese security analysts’ recommendations from 2005 to
2010, we examine the source of analysts’ superiority and the investment value
of their recommendations. Using a calendar-time portfolio approach, we ﬁnd
that, on average, analysts’ recommendations are valuable and that analysts are
better at analyzing and transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc information than
market-wide or industry-level information. In addition, we show that the
investment value of recommendations increases as ﬁrm-speciﬁc information
becomes more important in stock pricing. Our empirical results are useful in
guiding investors and helping brokerage houses to evaluate the output of
research departments.
 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of
Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City Univer-
sity of Hong Kong. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
The securities analyst industry has grown rapidly with the development of the Chinese capital market. The
number of practitioners, their salaries and the market inﬂuence of the securities-consulting industry has
undergone rapid changes over the past few years. Meanwhile, problems related to security analysts, such as
the value of the securities analyst industry, the information content of analysts’ research reports and
the investment value of analysts’ recommendations, have caused great concern among academics and
practitioners.Yat-sen
278 L. Li et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 7 (2014) 277–299The solutions to these issues will inevitably involve studying analysts’ expertise. According to the eﬃcient
market hypothesis (EMH), Roll (1988) decomposes the information incorporated into stock prices into three
types: market-level, industry-level and ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. However, the extent to which these three
types of information explain the variations in ﬁrms’ stock returns varies. If ﬁrms’ stock returns are mainly
explained by ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, investors have a greater need for ﬁrm-speciﬁc information than for
market- or industry-level information. In this case, security analysts who are good at analyzing and
transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc information will be favored, as their research reports are better able to alleviate
the information asymmetry between listed companies and investors. In contrast, if ﬁrms’ stock returns are
mainly explained by industry-level information, then security analysts who are good at analyzing and
transferring industry-level information will perform better. Unfortunately, previous studies still provide no
consistent conclusion on what makes a superior securities analyst. Some studies have shown that analysts’
expertise lies in analyzing and transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc information (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980;
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Bhushan, 1989; Ramnath et al., 2008; Palmon and Yezegel, 2012). Other
scholars suggest that analysts play an important role during the process of searching, analyzing and
transferring industry-level information (e.g., Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Chan and Hameed, 2006). The
conclusions of these studies are inconsistent due to diﬀerences in their research samples and designs. As a secu-
rities analyst may be good at analyzing and transferring either ﬁrm-speciﬁc or industry-level information,
which of these is superior is an empirical question. This study attempts to answer the question of what
constitutes security analysts’ superiority and their role in the capital market.
In this paper, we use 192,012 recommendations issued by Chinese security analysts from 2005 to 2010
and use a calendar-time portfolio approach to study the following two questions: (1) what constitutes Chi-
nese security analysts’ superiority? and (2) how do the demand and supply factors of analysts’ research
activities inﬂuence the investment value of recommendations? We calculate three estimates of abnormal
returns for each portfolio, namely market-adjusted returns, the intercept of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) and the intercept of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. The empirical results indi-
cate, ﬁrst, that Chinese security analysts are better at analyzing and transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc information
than market- or industry-level information. Speciﬁcally, ceteris paribus, analysts’ research reports increase
the ability of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information to explain variations in stock returns, but reduce the ability of mar-
ket- and industry-level information to explain variations in ﬁrms’ stock returns. In addition, covering more
ﬁrms in the same industry does not improve security analysts’ ability to capture the changes in industry-
level information and hence improve the investment value of their recommendations. Second, analysts’ rec-
ommendations have greater investment value when ﬁrm-speciﬁc information plays a major role in stock
pricing, but there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in investment value when industry-level information plays a
major role in stock pricing.
This paper helps us to understand the comparative advantages of analysts and enriches the literature on
the relationship between analyst behavior and R2. Assessing the investment value of analysts’ recommenda-
tions is actually identical to identifying and conﬁrming the source of analysts’ superiority. Loh and Mian
(2006) suggest that the comparative advantages of superior analysts lie in their ability to accurately predict
accounting earnings and then convert them into stock recommendations. Hence, they examine the invest-
ment value of recommendations based on the accuracy of accounting earnings predictions. Palmon and
Yezegel (2012) shows that the advantages of analysts lie in analyzing and transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information, and thus uses the R&D expenditure ratio (as a proxy of the degree of information asymmetry
between listed companies and investors) to measure the investment value of analysts’ recommendations. As
the investment value is rooted in analysts’ comparative advantages, any empirical ﬁndings regarding when
and which research reports have greater investment value will also help to explain analysts’ comparative
advantages. Our study indicates that Chinese security analysts are better at processing ﬁrm-speciﬁc than
industry information. Unlike Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), who only explore the relationship between
the number of analysts following and R2, this study combines the supply and demand factors of analysts’
research activities and provides more direct and convincing empirical evidence for how analysts’ recommen-
dations inﬂuence stock prices, which enriches the literature on the relationship between analyst behavior
and R2.
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Roll (1988) decomposes information into market-level, industry-level and ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. He
points out that ﬁrms’ stock returns should be explained by these three kinds of information under the
EMH. The extent to which market, industry and ﬁrm-level information explain variations in ﬁrms’ stock
returns are calculated as follows.Ri;j;t ¼ ai þ bi  Rm;t þ ei;j;t ð1Þ
Ri;j;t ¼ ai þ bi  Rm;t þ ci  Rj;t þ ei;j;t ð2Þwhere Ri,j,t denotes the stock return for ﬁrm i in industry j on day t, Rm,t denotes the value-weighted market
return on day t and Rj,t denotes the industry return for industry j on day t. The regression statistic for model
(1), R2, measures the percentage of the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns that is explained by market-level infor-
mation. The regression statistic for model (2), R2, measures the percentage of the variation in ﬁrms’ stock
returns that is explained by market- and industry-level information. Thus, the diﬀerence in R2 between model
(2) and model (1) represents the percentage of the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns that is explained by indus-
try-level information. 1  R2 measures the percentage of the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns that is explained
by ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. Roll (1988) shows that on average, only 20–30% of the variation in stock returns
can be explained by market- and industry-level information. Morck et al. (2000) ﬁnd that R2 is lower in devel-
oped than in emerging economies and conclude that the high R2 in emerging economies is associated with poor
protection of investor property rights, thus reducing investors’ incentives to use ﬁrm fundamentals. They also
propose the concept of synchronicity to reﬂect the extent to which stock returns tend to move together. Based
on the study by Morck et al. (2000), Durnev et al. (2003) further explore the economic consequences of R2 and
ﬁnd that a lower R2 indicates more information about future earnings in current stock returns, and vice versa.
They argue that stock markets with more synchronous returns exhibit lower eﬃciency, which means that the
degree of stock price synchronicity is no longer a neutral phenomenon.
It should be noted that Morck et al. (2000) deﬁne two stock price synchronicity measures: F, deﬁned as the
fraction of stocks in a country whose prices rise (or fall) and weighted R2. F represents the proportion of stock
prices that move in the same direction within a country, a higher F indicates that stock prices frequently move
together. R2 represents the relationship between stock returns and market returns (i.e. the extent to which mar-
ket returns explains variations in ﬁrms’ stock returns). In contrast to F, R2 neither reﬂects the relationship
between two changes (in the same or the opposite direction), nor characterizes the magnitude of the changes.
In fact, it is hard to judge whether a high R2 is a good or bad phenomenon. The use of the word synchronicity
seems to imply that a high R2 is a bad phenomenon. For example, Jin and Myers (2006) suggest that R2 can be
used as an indicator of a ﬁrm’s transparency. Opaque stocks with a high R2 are also more likely to crash.
However, other studies do not support the interpretation of Morck et al. (2000), while agreeing with Roll’s
(1988) classiﬁcation of information. For example, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) ﬁnd that R2 is positively
associated with analyst forecasting activities in the U.S., consistent with analysts increasing the amount of
industry-level information in prices through intra-industry information transfers. Therefore, a higher R2 nei-
ther indicates a less eﬃcient market, nor greater opacity. Chan et al. (2013) show that a higher R2 improves
liquidity, contradicting the view that it is usually negatively related to market eﬃciency and ﬁrm transparency.
Kelly (2005) also opposes the view of Durnev et al. (2003) that R2 can be used as a proxy for information eﬃ-
ciency. Teoh et al. (2007) consider that a lower R2 is the result of noisy trading and Hou et al. (2013) also
doubt the conclusion that a lower R2 is associated with higher pricing eﬃciency.
From this contradictory evidence, we can draw the following two conclusions. First, the factors that inﬂu-
ence R2 are varied and it is hard to judge whether a high R2 is good or bad. Second, regardless of the cause of a
high R2 and whether it is a good or bad phenomenon, Roll (1988) interprets R2 as the extent to which market-
and industry-level information explains the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns. Brockman and Yan (2009) use
1  R2 as a proxy of the percentage of the variation in a ﬁrm’s stock returns that is directly explained by
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information.
Feng et al. (2009) also justify that R2 can be used as a proxy for measuring private information arbitrage
activities. However, we argue that this may be open to question. The direct extension of Roll’s interpretation is
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of market- and industry-level information to explain the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns is weak, thus ﬁrm-
speciﬁc information plays a more important role in predicting stock returns. In contrast, a high R2 illustrates
that market- and industry-level information can easily predict ﬁrm performance, while ﬁrm-speciﬁc informa-
tion is relatively less important. Here, ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is not necessarily private information. For
example, announcements of accounting earnings, mergers and acquisitions, and management turnovers are
all types of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, but are not necessarily private information. Roll (1988) excludes stock
returns near the event day to investigate the eﬀect of market- and industry-level information on R2. Using a
clean sample that is unaﬀected by ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, the results show that R2 does not improve signif-
icantly, conﬁrming the existence of private information. However, due to the following reasons, there are still
some problems with Roll’s (1988) method. First, for ﬁrms with diﬀerent R2, ﬁrm-speciﬁc information does not
have the same importance, thus the extent of the eﬀect of such information on stock returns is distinct. Roll’s
approach underestimates the inﬂuence of events for ﬁrms with low R2 and overestimates it for ﬁrms with high
R2. As the magnitude of R2 measured by Roll’s (1988) method is low, excluding daily stock returns near the
event day will seriously underestimate the inﬂuence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. Second, as ﬁrm-speciﬁc infor-
mation is endless, it is diﬃcult to perfectly exclude the eﬀect of events from two newspapers, thus underesti-
mating the inﬂuence of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. Therefore, a low R2 does not necessarily imply the existence
of private information, but it must indicate that ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is very important.
In summary, we suggest that R2 can be used as an indicator to measure the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information in stock pricing. The higher the value of R2, the less important ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is.
Yang et al. (2014) examine whether the research reports of Chinese security analysts have investment
value and ﬁnd that, on average, analysts’ recommendations are valuable. Speciﬁcally, the duration of the
investment value is quite short (usually a couple of days) when it comes to favorable recommendations,
while the duration is much longer (usually several months) when it comes to unfavorable recommendations.
Furthermore, they also investigate the diﬀerence in investment value between star analysts’ and non-star
analysts’ research reports. The empirical results show that the investment value of favorable recommenda-
tions issued by star analysts is greater than non-star analysts, while the diﬀerence in investment value is not
signiﬁcant for unfavorable recommendations. Unlike Yang et al. (2014), we attempt to answer the question
of what constitutes the Chinese security analysts’ superiority, which helps to understand the comparative
advantages of analysts.
In fact, the expertise of security analysts is examined extensively in the literature and the majority of studies
investigate whether analysts are able to identify the eﬀect of a speciﬁc accounting variable or economic event.
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) investigate the relationship between the number of analysts following and R2,
and the results conﬁrm that analysts are good at analyzing and transferring industry-level information. The
advantage of our research is that it examines the relationship between analysts’ recommendations and R2
to provide a better understanding of the inﬂuence of analysts’ behavior, and thus provides more direct
evidence on the source of analysts’ superiority. Therefore, we aim to answer the following three questions.
First, once research reports are issued, the extent to which market- and industry-level information can
explain the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns will increase if the security analysts are mainly analyzing and
transferring industry-level information, thus increasing R2. Therefore, we expect that R2 should decrease if
daily stock returns around the report announcement date are removed. Conversely, when analysts are good
at analyzing and transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, we expect that R2 should increase if daily stock returns
around the event day are excluded. Considering that the main role of analysts is to improve the extent to which
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information explains the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns, R2 should decline. Based on the above
analysis, we propose the following two competing hypotheses.
H1a. The release of research reports increases ﬁrms’ R2 when security analysts are good at analyzing and
transferring industry-level information.
H1b. The release of research reports decreases ﬁrms’ R2 when security analysts are good at analyzing and
transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc information.
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casts is negatively associated with the number of ﬁrms and industries that the analyst covers (proxy for the
degree of analyst expertise). To further test the inﬂuence of analysts’ superiority, we examine the relationship
between the number of ﬁrms in the same industry that the analyst covers and the investment value of research
reports. Analysts covering a larger number of ﬁrms in the same industry should be able to obtain more timely
and accurate industry-level information, thus improving the investment value of research reports when secu-
rity analysts are good at analyzing and transferring such information. Conversely, when analysts are not good
at analyzing and transferring industry-level information, covering more ﬁrms in the same industry should not
bring additional knowledge or improve the investment value of their research reports. Based on the above
analysis, we propose the following two competing hypotheses.
H2a. The investment value of research reports is positively associated with the number of ﬁrms in the same
industry that a securities analyst covers when the analyst is good at analyzing and transferring industry-level
information.
H2b. The investment value of research reports is unrelated to the number of ﬁrms in the same industry that a
securities analyst covers when the analyst is good at analyzing and transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc information.
The supply factors that inﬂuence analysts’ activities are discussed above. Next, we analyze the demand fac-
tors that derive from the information asymmetry in the capital market. However, the concept of information
asymmetry is used as a general term because diﬀerent ﬁrms have varied information asymmetry. For example,
Bradshaw et al. (2001) and Barth et al. (2001) point out that accruals and intangible assets are important
sources of information asymmetry. Palmon and Yezegel (2012) argue that the R&D expenditure ratio is also
an important source of information asymmetry. All of these types of information asymmetry aﬀect the behav-
ior of security analysts. Lang and Lundholm (1996), Healy and Palepu (2001) and Byard and Shaw (2003) use
diﬀerent disclosure indices to measure the degree of information asymmetry, and examine the inﬂuence of
these indices on analyst behavior. We can see that information asymmetry is varied and the key question is
which types of information are most important. Although previous studies examine several types of informa-
tion asymmetry, none considers which type of information is the most valuable overall. In fact, prior studies
only examine incremental information asymmetry caused by a particular account, which is not necessarily the
most important demand from the perspective of analysts’ activities.
By combining the supply and demand factors of analysts’ research activities, this study attempts to provide
a more comprehensive framework to investigate these research questions. As mentioned, Roll (1988) decom-
poses the information incorporated into stock prices into three kinds of information: market-wide, industry-
level and ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. Speciﬁcally, market-wide information such as monetary policy, ﬁscal pol-
icy and market shocks is value relevant for all stocks. Industry-level information such as industry policy and
industry shocks is value relevant for all stocks in a particular industry. Firm-speciﬁc information such as
announcements of accounting earnings, dividends and mergers and acquisitions is value relevance for a
particular stock.
Theoretically, all of the company’s stock returns can be explained by these three types of information, but
the extent to which market-, industry- and ﬁrm-level information explain the variation in a ﬁrm’s stock returns
diﬀers. Dechow et al. (2010) suggest that a ﬁrm’s fundamental earnings process is jointly determined by its
operating cycle, macro environment, investment opportunities, management and other ﬁrm characteristics.
These ﬁrm characteristics not only aﬀect the proﬁtability of the company directly, but also determine the
importance of diﬀerent types of information for stock pricing. For some companies, industry-level informa-
tion is more important, whereas for others, ﬁrm-speciﬁc information may be more important. This study
attempts to identify which type of information asymmetry is the most important, thus resulting in the demand
for analysts’ activities. If companies’ stock returns are mainly explained by industry-level (ﬁrm-speciﬁc) infor-
mation, investors will have a great need for analysts who are good at searching and analyzing industry-level
(ﬁrm-speciﬁc) information.
Our research combines the supply and demand factors of analysts’ research activities to examine the invest-
ment value of analysts’ recommendations. Table 1 summarizes the framework of supply and demand factors.
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and demand of security analysts’ activities will match perfectly if the analysts are good at analyzing and trans-
ferring such information. In this case, their research reports have higher investment value because they are
better able to alleviate the information asymmetry. In contrast, the supply and demand of analysts’ activities
will be mismatched if the analysts are good at analyzing and transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. In this
case, their research reports have lower investment value because they have limited ability to alleviate the infor-
mation asymmetry. If ﬁrms’ stock returns are mainly explained by ﬁrm-speciﬁc information, the supply and
demand of analysts’ activities will match perfectly if the analysts are good at analyzing and transferring such
information. In this case, their research reports have greater investment value because they are better able to
alleviate the information asymmetry. Conversely, the supply and demand of analysts’ activities will be mis-
matched if the analysts are good at analyzing and transferring industry-level information. In this case, their
research reports have lower investment value because they have limited ability to alleviate the information
asymmetry. Based on the above analysis, we propose the following pair of competing hypotheses.
H3a. Analysts’ research reports have greater investment value when industry-level information plays a more
important role in stock pricing.
H3b. Analysts’ research reports have greater investment value when ﬁrm-speciﬁc information plays a more
important role in stock pricing.3. Research design
Following previous studies (Barber et al., 2001; Loh and Mian, 2006), we construct calendar-time portfolios
to calculate the abnormal returns of analysts’ recommendations. This methodology was initially used by Jaﬀe
(1974) and Mandelker (1974), and was strongly supported by Fama (1998). Compared with buy-and-hold
portfolios, our methodology has several advantages. First, bad-model problems are more acute with long-term
buy-and-hold abnormal returns, which compound an expected-return model’s problems in explaining short-
term returns (Fama, 1998). Second, it is diﬃcult to control for intra-portfolio correlations and easy to obtain
signiﬁcant results when we estimate the long-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Conversely, using calen-
dar-time portfolios to calculate long-term abnormal returns automatically cancels out the intra-portfolio cor-
relations. Last but not least, the calendar-time portfolio approach is more investor-oriented and more feasible
as an investment strategy.
In this paper, we construct two kinds of portfolios, one based on analysts’ consensus recommendations and
another based on revised or initial recommendations. As we need a long period to calculate analysts’ consen-
sus recommendations, the former portfolio is used to examine the long-term investment value of research
reports, while the latter portfolio is more suitable to examine the short-term investment value because the
exact recommendation dates are available.
3.1. Test of Hypothesis 1
To investigate the inﬂuence of research reports issued by security analysts on a ﬁrm’s R2 (i.e. Hypothesis 1),
we use the following procedure.
First, using daily stock returns from day T  2X to T  1 (where X = 30, 90, 180), we regress model (3) and
model (4) by ﬁrm to estimate the R2 statistic, respectively.Ri;j;t ¼ ai þ b1;i  Rm;t þ b2;i  Rm;t1 þ ei;j;t ð3Þ
Ri;j;t ¼ ai þ b1;i  Rm;t þ c1;i  Rj;t þ b2;i  Rm;t1 þ c2;i  Rj;t1 þ ei;j;t ð4ÞwhereRj;t ¼
X
k2j
Rk;j;t  W k;j;t  Ri;j;t  W i;j;t
Table 1
Analysis of supply and demand factors in the investment value of recommendations.
Type of information asymmetry Analysts’ superiority
Industry-level information Firm-speciﬁc information
Stock returns are mainly explained by
industry-level information
High investment value (perfect match
between supply and demand)
Low investment value (mismatch between
supply and demand)
Stock returns are mainly explained by
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information
Low investment value (mismatch between
supply and demand)
High investment value (perfect match
between supply and demand)
1 All
other w
2 Giv
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where Ri,j,t denotes the stock return for ﬁrm i in industry j on day t. Rj,t denotes the industry return for indus-
try j on day t with Ri,j,t omitted. The industry classiﬁcation criteria are based on the “Industry Classiﬁcation
Guidance for Listed Companies” published by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2001.
We adopt a three-digit code category for the manufacturing industry (C) and a two-digit code category for
other industries. We also restrict industries with no less than 10 listed companies when calculating industry
returns. Rm,t denotes the value-weighted market return on day t with Rj,t omitted. Wk,j,t, Wi,j,t and Wj,t
represent the weight of market capitalization on day t.
The R2 regression statistic for model (3) measures the percentage of the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns that
is explained by market-level information. The R2 regression statistic for model (4) measures the percentage of
the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns that is explained by market- and industry-level information. Therefore, the
diﬀerence between the R2 values for models (3) and (4) represents the percentage of the variation in ﬁrms’
stock returns that is explained by industry-level information.
Second, for each ﬁrm i, we exclude daily stock returns on the day before, the day of and the day following
the recommendation date, and re-regress model (4) to estimate R2new.
Finally, we test the diﬀerence between R2 and R2new. An R
2 value that is higher (lower) than the R2new value
indicates that security analysts are good at analyzing and transferring industry-level (ﬁrm-speciﬁc) informa-
tion, thus increasing (decreasing) R2.
3.2. Test of Hypothesis 2
To examine whether the number of ﬁrms that analysts cover in the same industry aﬀects the investment
value of research reports (i.e. Hypothesis 2), we adopt the following procedure.
We begin with a simple calculation of the number of ﬁrms covered by each analyst and for each industry.
For each analyst, the number of ﬁrms in the same industry covered is calculated on a 180-day window before
day T (i.e. from day T  180 to T  1). The industry classiﬁcation is deﬁned as described in Section 3.1.
Next, we divide the sample into low and high groups according to the median number of ﬁrms that the
analysts cover in the same industry.
Finally, we test the diﬀerence in the investment value of the two groups for each of our constructed port-
folios. We calculate three estimates of abnormal returns for each portfolio, namely market-adjusted returns,
the intercept of the CAPM and the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model. All portfolio returns are
monthly returns.
For the revised or initial recommendations portfolio, the portfolio on date T is constructed as follows. We
purchase stocks depending on the revised or initial recommendations during the T  d to T  1 period (where
d = 1, 5, 7).1 Speciﬁcally, we purchase stocks with initial recommendations no higher than 2, or upgrade
ratings with new recommendations no higher than 2.2recommendations of strong buy, buy, hold, sell and strong sell are deﬁned as integer numbers between 1 and 5, respectively. In
ords, a rating of 1 reﬂects a strong buy recommendation, 2a buy, 3a hold, 4a sell and 5a strong sell.
en that downgrade recommendations are rare in our sample, we do not construct short portfolios.
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by calculating the consensus recommendations of each covered ﬁrm during the T  X to T  1 period (where
X = 30, 90, 180) according to model (5). Then, we purchase stocks in the portfolio with consensus recommen-
dations no higher than 2 and sell short stocks in the portfolio with consensus recommendations higher than
2.5. Stocks with consensus recommendations between 2 and 2.5 are excluded from the transactions to reduce
the eﬀect of analyst optimism (Barber et al., 2001; Loh and Mian, 2006).Consensusi;T1;TX ¼ 1Ni;T1;TX
XNi;T1;TX
j¼1
Reci;j;T1;TX ð5Þwhere Ni,T1,TX is the number of recommendations for ﬁrm i during the T  X to T  1 period, Reci,j,T1,TX
is the standardized analyst recommendation of analyst j for ﬁrm i. All recommendations of strong buy, buy,
hold, sell and strong sell are deﬁned as integer numbers between 1 and 5, respectively.
3.3. Test of Hypothesis 3
To examine how the supply and demand factors aﬀect the investment value of research reports (i.e.
Hypothesis 3), we sort the sample by the extent to which ﬁrm-speciﬁc and industry-level information explain
the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns, respectively.
(1) Sort by the extent to which ﬁrm-speciﬁc information explains the variation in stock returns.
First, we regress model (4) by ﬁrm to calculate the extent to which ﬁrm-speciﬁc information explains the
variation in stock returns from day T  60 to T  1 (i.e. 1  R2), and classify all covered ﬁrms into one of
ﬁve groups.
Second, for each group, using the investment strategy in Section 3.2, we construct two kinds of portfolios
based on consensus recommendations and revised recommendations, respectively. After determining the com-
position of each portfolio on date T  1, the value-weighted portfolio returns are calculated.
Finally, we calculate three estimates of abnormal returns for each portfolio, namely market-adjusted
returns, the intercept of CAPM and the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model.
(2) Sort by the extent to which industry-level information explains the variation in stock returns.
First, using daily returns from day T  60 to T  1, we regress models (3) and (4) for each ﬁrm to
calculate R2, respectively. The diﬀerence in R2 between models (3) and (4) measures the extent to which indus-
try-level information explains the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns. We classify all covered ﬁrms into one of ﬁve
groups.
Second, for each group, using the investment strategy in Section 3.2 we construct two portfolios based on
consensus recommendations and revised recommendations, respectively. After determining the composition of
each portfolio on date T  1, the value-weighted portfolio returns are calculated.
Finally, we calculate three estimates of abnormal returns for each portfolio, namely market-adjusted
returns, the intercept of CAPM and the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Sample selection and data sources
We obtain analysts’ recommendation data from the WIND database during the 2005–2010 period. The
WIND database covers most of the analysts’ recommendations, including details such as the recommendation
date, the type of recommendation (if the recommendation is not an initially oﬀered one, the record also
includes the last recommendation), the analysts’ names and their aﬃliated brokerage houses. One problem
is that for a certain period, the WIND database only allows querying the latest recommendation for each ﬁrm
Table 2
Distribution of analysts’ recommendations.
Year Recommendations Total
1 2 3 4 5
2005 3810 13,677 14,780 1480 50 33,797
(11.27%) (40.47%) (43.73%) (4.38%) (0.15%)
2006 12,326 27,030 16,208 1345 42 56,951
(21.64%) (47.46%) (28.46%) (2.36%) (0.07%)
2007 7682 11,796 4987 261 17 24,743
(31.05%) (47.67%) (20.16%) (1.05%) (0.07%)
2008 7403 10,749 3855 222 44 22,273
(33.24%) (48.26%) (17.31%) (1.00%) (0.20%)
2009 7561 13,851 4233 175 27 25,847
(29.25%) (53.59%) (16.38%) (0.68%) (0.10%)
2010 10,727 14,838 2773 49 14 28,401
(37.77%) (52.24%) (9.76%) (0.17%) (0.05%)
Total 49,509 91,941 46,836 3532 194 192,012
(25.78%) (47.88%) (24.39%) (1.84%) (0.10%)
Note: Recommendations of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 indicate strong buy, buy, hold, sell and strong sell, respectively. The percentages of respective
types of recommendations to the total number of recommendations are reported in parentheses.
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for each brokerage-ﬁrm-analyst keyword, we query the recommendation records by week. Finally, we obtain
192,012 recommendations as the initial sample.
Both the ﬁnancial and stock return data are obtained from the CSMAR database. To reduce the eﬀect of
potential outliers, we drop all observations with an absolute value of daily returns higher than 11%. The
risk-free rate (measured by the monthly yield rate on treasury bills) and Fama-French three-factor data are
collected from the RESSET database.
Table 2 reports the distribution of analysts’ recommendations. We ﬁnd that two types of recommendations,
strong buy (1) and buy (2), account for almost three quarters of the total number, while no more than 2% of
recommendations are lower than sell (4), consistent with Loh and Mian (2006). The results indicate that on
average, security analysts are less willing to issue unfavorable than favorable recommendations, and tend
to be optimistic. Following Loh and Mian (2006), we purchase stocks with consensus recommendations no
higher than 2 and sell short stocks with consensus recommendations higher than 2.5 to control for analyst
optimism.
Next, we divide the sample into revised and initially oﬀered recommendations. Table 3 illustrates that for
the initial recommendations sample, strong buy (1) and buy (2) recommendations account for more than 70%,
while sell (4) and strong sell (5) recommendations account for only about 2%. For revised recommendations,
most of the downgrade ratings are changed to buy (2) or hold (3) recommendations, consistent with the ﬁnd-
ing that analysts rarely issue unfavorable recommendations even when they downgrade a ﬁrm. Most of the
revised recommendations are upgrades or reiterations, which further supports the view that analysts tend
to be optimistic.4.2. Empirical results of Hypothesis 1: analysts’ superiority
Hypothesis 1 examines whether the research reports issued by analysts increase the percentage of the
variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns that is explained by ﬁrm-speciﬁc (or industry-level) information.
Table 4 reports the results using a 60-day window ending on date T  1 to estimate ﬁrms’ R2 (i.e. X = 30).
We ﬁnd that the mean (median) percentage of the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns that is explained by indus-
try-level information is 36.30% (35.33%) and the percentage of the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns that is
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of analysts’ revised and initially oﬀered recommendations.
Type of recommendation Recommendations Total
1 2 3 4 5
Upgrade 6767 5577 433 4 0 12,781
(52.95%) (43.64%) (3.39%) (0.03%) (0.00%)
Reiteration 37,331 68,697 34,801 2607 72 143,508
(26.01%) (47.87%) (24.25%) (1.82%) (0.05%)
Downgrade 0 4490 5524 462 58 10,534
(0.00%) (42.62%) (52.44%) (4.39%) (0.55%)
Initially oﬀered 5411 13,177 6078 459 64 25,189
(21.48%) (52.31%) (24.13%) (1.82%) (0.25%)
Note: Recommendations of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 indicate strong buy, buy, hold, sell and strong sell, respectively. The percentages of respective
types of recommendations to the total number of recommendations are reported in parentheses.
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inﬂuence of analysts’ research reports on ﬁrms’ R2 is 3.80% (1.41%), which indicates that the extent to
which ﬁrm-speciﬁc information explains the variation in stock returns increases by 3.80% (1.41%). Although
some of the research reports seem to increase the extent to which market- and industry-level information
explain the variation in stock returns, the main role of analysts is to improve the extent to which ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information explains the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns, and thus their superiority is in analyzing and trans-
ferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc information.
As a robustness test, we also use 180-day and 360-day windows ending on date T  1 to estimate ﬁrms’ R2
(i.e. X = 90, 180). The results are consistent.3
From the above evidence, we can conclude that the main role of analysts is to improve the extent to which
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information explains the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns, which supports H1b. Therefore, Chi-
nese security analysts are good at analyzing and transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. If the above conclusion
is correct, we further expect that covering more ﬁrms in the same industry will not improve the investment
value of analysts’ research reports (Hypothesis 2).4.3. Empirical results of Hypothesis 2: the inﬂuence of the number of ﬁrms covered
Hypothesis 2 examines whether the research reports issued by analysts who cover more ﬁrms in the same
industry have greater investment value.
Table 5 presents the results based on the portfolio of analysts’ revised recommendations. Speciﬁcally, Panel
A shows the investment value of favorable recommendations issued by analysts who cover a low number of
ﬁrms. Using the recommendations issued on date T  1 to construct the portfolio (the daily portfolio contains
4.09 stocks on average), we ﬁnd that the portfolio raw and market-adjusted returns are 11.43% and 8.30%,
respectively, while the intercept of the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model is 7.76% and 7.78%,
respectively. All portfolio returns are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. We expect that less frequent rebalancing
will cause portfolio returns to diminish in magnitude. With a 5-day rebalancing period, for example, the port-
folio returns decline from 7.78% to 2.75% under the Fama-French three-factor model (column 4) and remain
signiﬁcant. When we further expand the rebalancing period to 7 days, the portfolio returns decline from 7.78%
with 1-day rebalancing to 1.59% with 7-day rebalancing under the Fama-French three-factor model, but still
with marginal signiﬁcance. These empirical results suggest that the favorable recommendations issued by ana-
lysts who cover a low number of ﬁrms are valuable.
Panel B of Table 5 illustrates the investment value of favorable recommendations issued by analysts who
cover a high number of ﬁrms. Similarly, using the recommendations issued on date T  1 to construct the3 For simplicity, we do not tabulate the results of the robustness tests, but they are available upon request.
Table 4
The inﬂuence of analysts’ research reports on ﬁrms’ stock returns.
Types of information Mean
(%)
Q1 (%) Median
(%)
Q3 (%) t-Value
(%)
% of variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns explained by industry-level
information
36.30 22.75 35.33 48.94 1670.11
% of variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns explained by market- and industry-
level information
52.45 39.61 52.88 65.96 2368.62
The inﬂuence of analysts’ research reports on ﬁrms’ R2 3.80 6.40 1.41 1.32 267.15
Note: We use daily stock returns from day T  60 to T  1 to estimate the R2 statistic by ﬁrm. The percentage of the variation in ﬁrms’
stock returns explained by market- and industry-level information is deﬁned as the R2 statistic for model (4). The percentage of the
variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns explained by industry-level information is deﬁned as the diﬀerence in R2 between models (3) and (4). For
each ﬁrm, we exclude daily stock returns on the day before, the day of and the day following the recommendation date, and re-regress
model (4) to estimate R2new. The diﬀerence between R
2 and R2new measures the inﬂuence of analysts’ research reports on ﬁrms’ R
2.
Table 5
The inﬂuence of the number of ﬁrms covered on the investment value of analysts’ revised recommendations.
Rebalancing
period
Raw
Returns
Market-adjusted
Returns
Intercept of
CAPM
Intercept of three-factor
model
Daily covered
stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Low number of ﬁrms covered
1 day 0.1143*** 0.0830*** 0.0776*** 0.0778*** 4.09
(5.21) (6.25) (5.73) (5.40)
5 days 0.0619*** 0.0306*** 0.0279*** 0.0275** 15.44
(3.20) (2.93) (2.59) (2.42)
7 days 0.0496*** 0.0184** 0.0156* 0.0159 23.67
(2.66) (2.00) (1.65) (1.62)
Panel B: High number of ﬁrms covered
1 day 0.0903*** 0.0590*** 0.0566*** 0.0573*** 8.15
(4.54) (5.09) (4.71) (4.57)
5 days 0.0541*** 0.0228*** 0.0219** 0.0263*** 31.63
(3.10) (2.76) (2.55) (2.98)
7 days 0.0476*** 0.0164** 0.0159* 0.0208** 48.32
(2.79) (2.11) (1.97) (2.54)
Panel C: Diﬀerence between low and high
1 day 0.0240 0.0210 0.0205
(1.36) (1.16) (1.07)
5 days 0.0078 0.0060 0.0012
(0.58) (0.43) (0.08)
7 days 0.0020 0.0003 0.0049
(0.17) (0.02) (0.38)
Note: The number of ﬁrms covered in the same industry is calculated on a 180-day window before day T (i.e. from day T  180 to T  1)
for each analyst. The recommendations issued by analysts who cover less than the median number of ﬁrms in the same industry are
classiﬁed as “low number of ﬁrms covered” and the rest are classiﬁed as “high number of ﬁrms covered”. We adopt a three-digit code
category for the manufacturing industry and a two-digit code category for other industries. For each portfolio, we estimate abnormal
returns using market-adjusted returns, the intercept of the CAPM and the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model, respectively.
***, ** and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses.
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adjusted returns are 9.03% and 5.90%, respectively, while the intercept of the CAPM and Fama-French
three-factor model is 5.66% and 5.73%, respectively. All portfolio returns are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
The portfolio returns diminish in magnitude as the rebalancing period is lengthened to 5 days, declining from
5.73% with 1-day rebalancing to 2.63% with 5-day rebalancing under the Fama-French three-factor model
(column 4), which is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Further expanding the rebalancing period to 7 days,
the portfolio returns decline to 2.08% under the Fama-French three-factor model, but remains signiﬁcant.
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ﬁrms also have signiﬁcant investment value.
Panel C of Table 5 compares the diﬀerence in investment value for favorable recommendations between the
two types of analysts. A zero-investment portfolio based on the recommendations issued on T  1 indicates
that investors can earn positive abnormal returns. The portfolio market-adjusted return is 2.40% (with a
t-statistic of 1.36), whereas the intercepts of the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model are 2.10% (with
a t-statistic of 1.16) and 2.05% (with a t-statistic of 1.07), respectively. However, all of the hedge returns are
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The hedge returns decrease signiﬁcantly as the rebalancing period is
lengthened to 5 days, declining from 2.05% to 0.12% (with a t-statistic of 0.08) under the Fama-French
three-factor model (column 4), and further decrease as the rebalancing period is lengthened to 7 days,
declining to 0.49% (with a t-statistic of 0.38) under the Fama-French three-factor model. Overall, the
ﬁndings show that the favorable recommendations issued by analysts who cover a high number of ﬁrms do
not have a greater investment value than those issued by analysts who cover a low number of ﬁrms.
This ﬁnding also suggests that covering more ﬁrms does not mean that analysts have more industry-level
information. From the above evidence, we can conclude that Chinese security analysts are better at searching
for and analyzing ﬁrm-speciﬁc information rather than industry-level information.
Table 6 presents the estimated coeﬃcients for the Fama-French three-factor model. We ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcients on RMRF, SMB and HML are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the portfolios of the two types
of analysts, indicating that ﬁrm characteristics such as market risk, growth and book-to-market ratios are
qualitatively the same for each portfolio.
Table 7 presents the results based on the portfolio of analysts’ consensus recommendations. Speciﬁcally,
Panel A shows the investment value of favorable recommendations issued by the two types of analysts.
For analysts covering a low number of ﬁrms, the portfolio raw return of 2.86% is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level, whereas the portfolio abnormal returns estimated by market-adjusted returns and the intercepts of theTable 6
Fama-French three-factor regressions based on the portfolio of analysts’ revised recommendations.
Rebalancing period Coeﬃcient estimates for the three-factor model Adj-R2 N
RMRF SMB HML
Panel A: Low number of ﬁrms covered
1 day 1.1732*** 0.0006 0.0365 63.03 60
(9.49) (0.00) (0.08)
5 days 1.1163*** 0.1063 0.3162 70.18 60
(6.88) (0.48) (0.87)
7 days 1.1278*** 0.2014 0.3978 76.23 60
(13.34) (1.05) (1.27)
Panel B: High number of ﬁrms covered
1 day 1.1219*** 0.2547 0.4422 65.85 60
(10.42) (1.04) (1.11)
5 days 1.0295*** 0.3594** 0.0162 78.09 60
(13.57) (2.09) (0.06)
7 days 1.0077*** 0.3650** 0.0719 80.13 60
(14.29) (2.28) (0.27)
Panel C: Diﬀerence between low and high
1 day 0.0513 0.2554 0.4788 0.99 120
(0.31) (0.69) (0.79)
5 days 0.0868 0.2531 0.3000 0.54 120
(0.70) (0.90) (0.65)
7 days 0.1200 0.1636 0.4697 0.44 120
(1.09) (0.65) (1.15)
Note: Following Fama (1998), we deﬁne RMRF as value-weighted market returns minus the risk-free rate; SMB as the diﬀerence between
the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and one of large stocks; andHML as the diﬀerence between the daily returns
of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks. ***, ** and * represent signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses.
Table 7
The inﬂuence of the number of ﬁrms covered on the investment value of analysts’ consensus recommendations.
Number of ﬁrms covered by
analysts
Raw
Returns
Market-adjusted
Returns
Intercept of
CAPM
Intercept of three-factor
model
Daily covered
stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Long portfolios
Low number of ﬁrms 0.0286* 0.0027 0.0013 0.0020 127.77
(1.92) (0.59) (0.27) (0.45)
High number of ﬁrms 0.0315** 0.0003 0.0013 0.0052 211.56
(2.07) (0.06) (0.25) (1.09)
Diﬀerence between low and
high
0.0030 0.0030 0.0026 0.0028 83.79
p = 89.0% p = 65.9% p = 70.1% p = 61.5%
Panel B: Short portfolios
Low number of ﬁrms 0.0114 0.0199*** 0.0223*** 0.0196*** 38.27
(0.65) (2.93) (3.21) (2.80)
High number of ﬁrms 0.0138 0.0175*** 0.0193*** 0.0195*** 77.09
(0.81) (2.95) (3.15) (3.03)
Diﬀerence between low and
high
0.0024 0.0024 0.0030 0.0001 38.82
p = 92.2% p = 79.2% p = 73.9% p = 99.2%
Panel C: Hedge portfolios
Low number of ﬁrms 0.0172** 0.0210** 0.0217***
(2.10) (2.51) (2.58)
High number of ﬁrms 0.0178** 0.0201*** 0.0247***
(2.32) (2.60) (3.09)
Diﬀerence between low and
high
0.0006 0.0009 0.0030
p = 95.9% p = 96.6% p = 79.7%
Note: Following Barber et al. (2001) and Loh and Mian (2006), we begin by calculating the consensus recommendations of each covered
ﬁrm during the T  30 to T  1 period according to model (5). Then we purchase stocks in the portfolio with consensus recommendations
no higher than 2 and sell short stocks in the portfolio with consensus recommendations higher than 2.5, while the stocks with consensus
recommendations between 2 and 2.5 are excluded. The recommendations issued by analysts who cover less than the median number of
ﬁrms in the same industry are classiﬁed as “low number of ﬁrms covered” and the rest are classiﬁed as “high number of ﬁrms covered”. For
each portfolio, we estimate abnormal returns using market-adjusted returns, the intercept of the CAPM and the intercept of the Fama-
French three-factor model, respectively. ***, ** and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, and t-statistics are
presented in parentheses.
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ings suggest that investors who purchase stocks based on analysts’ consensus recommendations during the
T  30 to T  1 period (i.e. X = 30) do not earn positive abnormal returns. Similarly, for analysts covering
a high number of ﬁrms, the portfolio abnormal returns are neither statistically or economically signiﬁcant.
The investment values of favorable recommendations also show no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two
types of analysts. The corresponding p-values of the abnormal returns estimated by market-adjusted returns
and the intercepts of the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model are 65.9%, 70.1% and 61.5%,
respectively.
Panel B illustrates the investment value of unfavorable recommendations issued by the two types of ana-
lysts. For analysts covering a low number of ﬁrms, except for the portfolio raw return of 1.14%, which is not
signiﬁcant, the portfolio abnormal returns estimated by market-adjusted returns and the intercepts of the
CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model are 1.99%, 2.23% and 1.96%, respectively, and all of them
are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The results for analysts covering a high number of ﬁrms are qualitatively
the same, with portfolio abnormal returns of 1.75%, 1.93% and 1.95%, respectively. The investment val-
ues of unfavorable recommendations also show no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two types of analysts.
The corresponding p-values of the abnormal returns estimated by market-adjusted returns and the intercepts
of the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model are 79.2%, 73.9% and 99.2%, respectively. The ﬁndings
suggest that both types of analysts’ unfavorable recommendations have signiﬁcant investment value.
Table 8
Fama-French three-factor model regressions based on the portfolios of analysts’ consensus recommendations.
Number of ﬁrms covered by analysts Coeﬃcient estimates for the three-factor model Adj-R2 N
RMRF SMB HML
Panel A: Long portfolios
Low number of ﬁrms 0.9530*** 0.2825*** 0.0338 91.83 60
(24.09) (3.15) (0.23)
High number of ﬁrms 0.9740*** 0.3581*** 0.1007 95.68 60
(23.98) (3.88) (0.67)
Panel B: Short portfolios
Low number of ﬁrms 1.0243*** 0.0304 0.5566** 86.23 60
(17.01) (0.22) (2.49)
High number of ﬁrms 1.0394*** 0.0925 0.1638 87.54 60
(18.78) (0.74) (0.80)
Panel C: Hedge portfolios
Low number of ﬁrms 0.0714 0.3130* 0.5904** 1.62 120
(0.99) (1.91) (2.21)
High number of ﬁrms 0.0655 0.4506*** 0.2644 1.53 120
(0.95) (2.89) (1.04)
Note: Following Fama (1998), we deﬁne RMRF as value-weighted market returns minus the risk-free rate; SMB as the diﬀerence between
the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and one of large stocks; andHML as the diﬀerence between the daily returns
of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks. ***, ** and * represent signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses.
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formed on the basis of analysts’ consensus recommendations are not only signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, but
also do not depend on the number of ﬁrms covered by analysts.
Table 8 reports the estimated coeﬃcients for the Fama-French three-factor model. The signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cients on SMB and HML indicate that favorable recommendations are associated with ﬁrms of large size
and lower book-to-market ratios, while unfavorable recommendations are associated with ﬁrms of small size
and higher book-to-market ratios.
As a robustness test, we also examine the abnormal returns for portfolios formed on the basis of analysts’
consensus recommendations during the T  90 to T  1 period (i.e. X = 90) and the T  180 to T  1 period
(i.e. X = 180), respectively. The results are qualitatively the same.
From the above evidence, we can conclude that the investment value of neither favorable nor unfavorable
recommendations shows a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two types of analysts. In other words, covering
more ﬁrms in the same industry does not help analysts to incorporate industry-level information into their
recommendations, supporting H2b. The results also further conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Hypothesis 1, that Chinese
analysts are good at analyzing and transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc rather than industry-level information.4.4. Empirical results of Hypothesis 3: the inﬂuence of supply and demand factors
Given that the above evidence shows that Chinese analysts are good at analyzing and transferring ﬁrm-spe-
ciﬁc information, we expect the investment value of analysts’ recommendations to increase (decrease) as ﬁrm-
speciﬁc (industry-level) information plays a more important role in stock pricing. Speciﬁcally, we examine the
following four cases.
Case #1: Sort by the extent to which ﬁrm-speciﬁc information explains the variation in stock returns and con-
struct portfolios based on recommendation changes. Table 9 reports the investment value of favorable recom-
mendations that involve daily portfolio rebalancing. As shown in columns 1–5 of Panel A, there is a
monotonic decrease in portfolio returns. Taking the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model as an
example, the abnormal returns on portfolios 1–5 are 11.15%, 7.44%, 6.91%, 6.41% and 3.24%, respectively,
and all of them are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The hedge returns that can be generated by a strategy
Table 9
The investment value of analysts’ revised recommendations by the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information in stock pricing.
Ranked by the importance of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information
Raw
Returns
Market-adjusted
Returns
Intercept of
CAPM
Intercept of three-
factor model
Daily covered
stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Portfolio returns
P1 (most important) 0.1314*** 0.1001*** 0.1054*** 0.1115*** 2.65
(5.12) (4.40) (4.49) (4.50)
P2 0.1053*** 0.0741*** 0.0745*** 0.0744*** 2.85
(5.62) (6.40) (6.18) (5.96)
P3 0.1055*** 0.0742*** 0.0662*** 0.0691*** 2.80
(4.22) (4.45) (3.92) (3.89)
P4 0.1040*** 0.0727*** 0.0656*** 0.0641*** 2.66
(4.47) (5.00) (4.47) (4.18)
P5 (least important) 0.0619*** 0.0306** 0.0318** 0.0324** 2.47
(3.03) (2.11) (2.11) (2.10)
P1–P5 0.0695** 0.0695** 0.0736*** 0.0791***
p = 3.6% p = 1.1% p = 0.4% p = 0.2%
Ranked by the importance of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc information
Coeﬃcient estimates for the three-factor model Adj-R2 N
RMRF SMB HML
Panel B: Fama-French three-factor model regressions
P1 (most important) 0.7570*** 0.2098 0.6368 19.13 60
(3.56) (0.43) (0.81)
P2 1.0410*** 0.2576 0.5895 62.06 60
(9.72) (1.06) (1.48)
P3 1.3020*** 0.3806 0.3366 56.83 60
(8.55) (1.10) (0.60)
P4 1.1826*** 0.3476 0.5056 62.89 60
(8.99) (1.16) (1.04)
P5 (least important) 1.0406*** 0.4217 0.8414* 51.02 60
(7.86) (1.40) (1.71)
Note:We regress model (4) by ﬁrm to calculate the extent to which ﬁrm-speciﬁc information explains the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns
during the T  60 to T  1 period (i.e. 1  R2) and classify all ﬁrms with revised or initial recommendations on date T  1 into one of ﬁve
groups. For each group, we purchase stocks with an initial recommendation no higher than 2 or upgrade ratings with a new recom-
mendation no higher than 2 to construct portfolios on date T. We estimate portfolio abnormal returns using market-adjusted returns, the
intercept of the CAPM and the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model, respectively. ***, ** and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels, respectively, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses.
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The portfolio abnormal returns estimated by market-adjusted returns and the CAPM intercept shows quali-
tative similar patterns. Panel B presents the estimated coeﬃcients for the Fama-French three-factor model.
Overall, Table 9 provides strong evidence that the investment value of analysts’ favorable recommendations
increases as ﬁrm-speciﬁc information plays a more important role in stock pricing.
Case #2: Sort by the extent to which industry-level information explains the variation in stock returns and
construct portfolios based on recommendation changes. Table 10 reports the investment value of favorable rec-
ommendations that involve daily portfolio rebalancing. From portfolios 1 to 5, the importance of industry-
level information in stock pricing increases. As shown in columns 1–5 of Panel A, there is no monotonic trend
in the portfolio returns. Taking the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model as an example, the
abnormal returns range from a low of 5.09% on portfolio 3, to a high of 9.54% on portfolio 4. The portfolio
abnormal returns estimated by market-adjusted returns and the CAPM intercept shows qualitative similar
patterns. Panel B presents the estimated coeﬃcients for the Fama-French three-factor model. Overall, the
above ﬁndings suggest that security analysts are not good at analyzing and transferring industry-level
information.
As a robustness test, we ﬁrst rank the full sample into ﬁve groups by the extent to which ﬁrm-speciﬁc infor-
mation explains the variation in stock returns and then re-construct long portfolios based on revised
Table 10
The investment value of analysts’ revised recommendations by the importance of industry-level information in stock pricing.
Ranked by the importance of industry-
level information
Raw
Returns
Market-adjusted
Returns
Intercept of
CAPM
Intercept of three-
factor model
Daily covered
stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Portfolio returns
P1 (least important) 0.0940*** 0.0627*** 0.0699*** 0.0760*** 2.65
(4.99) (4.04) (4.45) (4.66)
P2 0.1030*** 0.0718*** 0.0704*** 0.0723*** 2.73
(4.74) (4.74) (4.47) (4.38)
P3 0.0822*** 0.0510*** 0.0471*** 0.0509*** 2.77
(3.53) (3.16) (2.82) (2.88)
P4 0.1221*** 0.0908*** 0.0877*** 0.0954*** 2.78
(5.35) (5.75) (5.36) (5.59)
P5 (most important) 0.0998*** 0.0686*** 0.0625*** 0.0589*** 2.50
(4.40) (4.87) (4.36) (3.90)
P1–P5 0.0059 0.0059 0.0074 0.0171
p = 84.3% p = 78.0% p = 69.3% p = 33.3%
Ranked by the importance of industry-
level information
Coeﬃcient estimates for the three-factor model Adj-R2 N
RMRF SMB HML
Panel B: Fama-French three-factor model regressions
P1 (least important) 0.7671*** 0.5360* 0.1103 35.79 60
(5.48) (1.69) (0.21)
P2 1.0896*** 0.3595 0.4721 50.82 60
(7.70) (1.12) (0.90)
P3 1.1138*** 0.2471 0.1344 50.63 60
(7.34) (0.72) (0.24)
P4 1.0518*** 0.3769 0.5406 52.03 60
(7.18) (1.13) (0.99)
P5 (most important) 1.2451*** 0.0818 0.4690 62.01 60
(9.61) (0.28) (0.98)
Note: We deﬁne the percentage of the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns explained by industry-level information as the diﬀerence in R2
between models (3) and (4) during the T  60 to T  1 period, and classify all ﬁrms with revised or initial recommendations on date T  1
into one of ﬁve groups. For each group, we purchase stocks with an initial recommendation no higher than 2 or upgrade ratings with a new
recommendation no higher than 2 to construct portfolios on date T. We estimate portfolio abnormal returns using market-adjusted
returns, the intercept of the CAPM and the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model, respectively. ***, ** and * represent
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses.
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cept of the Fama-French three-factor model for each portfolio and each frequency of portfolio rebalancing.
The ﬁgure shows that (1) the analysts’ favorable recommendations are valuable, (2) investors react quickly
(within three days) to changes in analysts’ favorable recommendations and (3) the portfolio returns decrease
signiﬁcantly on portfolios 1–5. These ﬁndings support that the short-term investment value of analysts’ reports
increases as ﬁrm-speciﬁc information plays a more important role in stock pricing.
Similarly, we rank the full sample into ﬁve groups by the extent to which industry-level information
explains the variation in stock returns and then re-construct long portfolios based on recommendation
changes with a frequency of portfolio rebalancing of no more than 7 days. Fig. 2 illustrates the intercept of
the Fama-French three-factor model for each portfolio and each frequency of portfolio rebalancing. The
ﬁgure shows that there is no monotonic trend in portfolio returns, consistent with the results in Table 10.
Case #3: Sort by the extent to which ﬁrm-speciﬁc information explains the variation in stock returns and con-
struct portfolios based on consensus recommendations. Table 11 reports the portfolio returns. Speciﬁcally, Panel
A shows the investment value of favorable recommendations for each portfolio. From portfolios 1 to 5, the
importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information in stock pricing decreases. As shown in column 1, the raw returns on
portfolios 1–5 are signiﬁcantly positive at the 1 percent level, but the diﬀerence between portfolio 1 and port-
folio 5 is not signiﬁcant. In contrast, regardless of whether abnormal returns are estimated by market-adjusted
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Figure 1. The importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information and the investment value of analysts’ revised recommendations by rebalancing
frequency.
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Figure 2. The importance of industry-level information and the investment value of analysts’ revised recommendations by rebalancing
frequency.
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folios (except portfolio 1) abnormal returns are neither statistically nor economically signiﬁcant. These results
suggest that the duration of the investment value is quite short when it comes to favorable recommendations.
With a one-month delay, the portfolio abnormal returns are not signiﬁcantly greater than zero. It should be
noted that the slightly positive abnormal returns on portfolio 1 show, to some extent, that the investment
value of analysts’ recommendations increases as ﬁrm-speciﬁc information plays a more important role in stock
pricing.
Panel B illustrates the investment value of unfavorable recommendations for each portfolio. Most of the
portfolio abnormal returns in columns 2–4 are signiﬁcantly negative and diminish in magnitude as the impor-
tance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information in explaining the variation in stock returns decreases. Taking the intercept of
Fama-French three-factor model as an example, the abnormal returns on portfolios 1–5 are 5.42%, 1.73%,
2.29%, 2.55% and 1.56%, respectively, which are all signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level except for portfolio
2. In addition, the diﬀerence between portfolio 1 and portfolio 5 is 3.86% (with a p-value of 0.1%). These
results suggest that analysts’ unfavorable recommendations are valuable and that the duration of the invest-
ment value is much longer than that for favorable recommendations. Also as expected, the investment value of
analysts’ unfavorable recommendations increases as ﬁrm-speciﬁc information plays a more important role in
stock pricing.
Table 11
The investment value of analysts’ consensus recommendations by the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information in stock pricing.
Ranked by the importance of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc information
Raw
Returns
Market-adjusted
Returns
Intercept of
CAPM
Intercept of three-
factor model
Daily covered
stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Long portfolios
P1 (most important) 0.0406*** 0.0093 0.0137** 0.0112* 53.13
(2.88) (1.42) (2.15) (1.75)
P2 0.0335** 0.0022 0.0059 0.0046 52.70
(2.42) (0.45) (1.26) (0.96)
P3 0.0283** 0.0030 0.0003 0.0009 50.48
(2.03) (0.64) (0.07) (0.18)
P4 0.0380** 0.0067 0.0069 0.0082* 48.17
(2.46) (1.59) (1.56) (1.79)
P5 (least important) 0.0318** 0.0005 0.0009 0.0071 43.63
(1.99) (0.08) (0.14) (1.22)
P1–P5 0.0088 0.0088 0.0128 0.0095
p = 68.0% p = 32.7% p = 10.9% p = 58.0%
Panel B: Short portfolios
P1 (most important) 0.0205 0.0517*** 0.0472*** 0.0542*** 12.69
(1.24) (4.77) (4.29) (4.89)
P2 0.0190 0.0123 0.0160 0.0173* 13.17
(0.99) (1.27) (1.62) (1.76)
P3 0.0157 0.0155** 0.0185** 0.0229*** 14.89
(0.87) (2.01) (2.34) (2.82)
P4 0.0131 0.0182*** 0.0187*** 0.0255*** 16.40
(0.79) (2.76) (2.73) (4.38)
P5 (least important) 0.0198 0.0115* 0.0123** 0.0156*** 18.93
(1.21) (1.97) (2.02) (2.94)
P1–P5 0.0403* 0.0403*** 0.0349*** 0.0386***
p = 8.6% p = 0.1% p = 0.4% p = 0.1%
Panel C: Hedge portfolios
P1 (most important) 0.0610*** 0.0609*** 0.0654***
(4.82) (4.79) (5.10)
P2 0.0145 0.0218** 0.0219**
(1.34) (2.00) (2.00)
P3 0.0125 0.0189** 0.0220**
(1.39) (2.07) (2.34)
P4 0.0249*** 0.0256*** 0.0337***
(3.18) (3.14) (4.55)
P5 (least important) 0.0120 0.0131 0.0228***
(1.42) (1.50) (2.88)
P1–P5 0.0490*** 0.0478*** 0.0426***
p = 0.1% p = 0.1% p = 0.3%
Note:We regress model (4) by ﬁrm to calculate the extent to which ﬁrm-speciﬁc information explains the variation in stock returns during
the T  60 to T  1 period (i.e. 1  R2), and classify all ﬁrms with consensus recommendations into one of ﬁve groups. For each group, we
purchase stocks in the portfolio with consensus recommendations no higher than 2 and sell short stocks in the portfolio with consensus
recommendations larger than 2.5, while the stocks with consensus recommendations between 2 and 2.5 are excluded (Barber et al., 2001;
Loh and Mian, 2006). We estimate portfolio abnormal returns using market-adjusted returns, the intercept of the CAPM and the intercept
of the Fama-French three-factor model, respectively. ***, ** and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, and
t-statistics are presented in parentheses.
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portfolio hedge returns decrease monotonically as in Panel B. The portfolio hedge returns estimated by mar-
ket-adjusted returns and the intercepts of the CAPM and Fama-French three-factor model are 4.90%, 4.78%
and 4.26%, respectively, and all of them are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. These results further conﬁrm that
Table 12
Fama-French three-factor model regressions based on analysts’ consensus recommendations portfolios by the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information in stock pricing.
Ranked by the importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information Coeﬃcient estimates for the three-factor model Adj-R2 N
RMRF SMB HML
Panel A: Long portfolios
P1 (most important) 0.8954*** 0.0267 0.5065** 82.23 60
(16.24) (0.21) (2.47)
P2 0.9052*** 0.0488 0.3476** 90.00 60
(22.32) (0.53) (2.03)
P3 0.8992*** 0.0222 0.1685 90.11 60
(22.10) (0.24) (1.12)
P4 0.9990*** 0.1388 0.0727 92.49 60
(25.42) (1.56) (0.50)
P5 (least important) 0.9834*** 0.4873*** 0.0374 88.52 60
(19.61) (4.28) (0.20)
Panel B: Short portfolios
P1 (most important) 0.8396*** 0.5527** 0.0121 61.28 60
(8.82) (2.56) (0.03)
P2 1.0575*** 0.3819** 0.6254** 77.75 60
(12.52) (1.99) (2.00)
P3 1.0979*** 0.3284** 0.0466 82.82 60
(15.75) (2.08) (0.18)
P4 0.9882*** 0.6357*** 0.2036 89.40 60
(19.74) (5.59) (1.10)
P5 (least important) 0.9753*** 0.4680*** 0.4550*** 91.03 60
(21.38) (4.52) (2.69)
Panel C: Hedge portfolios
P1 (most important) 0.0559 0.5794** 0.4944 7.85 120
(0.51) (2.32) (1.21)
P2 0.1523 0.4307** 0.9729*** 3.30 120
(1.63) (2.03) (2.80)
P3 0.1988** 0.3062* 0.1219 1.59 120
(2.46) (1.67) (0.41)
P4 0.0108 0.7745*** 0.2762 3.30 120
(0.17) (5.36) (1.17)
P5 (least important) 0.0081 0.9553*** 0.4176* 3.75 120
(0.12) (6.21) (1.66)
Note: Following Fama (1998), we deﬁne RMRF as value-weighted market returns minus the risk-free rate; SMB as the diﬀerence between
the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and one of large stocks; andHML as the diﬀerence between the daily returns
of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks. ***, ** and * represent signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses.
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analysts’ research reports.
Table 12 reports the estimated coeﬃcients for the Fama-French three-factor model. The signiﬁcant coeﬃ-
cients on SMB indicate that unfavorable recommendations are associated with larger ﬁrm size than favorable
recommendations, while the coeﬃcients on RMRF and HML suggest that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in the market risk and book-to-market ratios between the two types of recommendations.
Case #4: Sort by the extent to which industry-level information explains the variation in stock returns and
construct portfolios based on consensus recommendations. Table 13 reports the portfolio returns. Panel A shows
that the abnormal returns for portfolios formed on the basis of analysts’ favorable recommendations are nei-
ther statistically nor economically signiﬁcant. Panel B shows that although analysts’ unfavorable recommen-
dations are valuable, there is no monotonic trend in portfolio returns across portfolios 1–5, especially
portfolio 5 in which industry-level information plays the most important role in stock pricing and which
Table 13
The investment value of analysts’ consensus recommendations by the importance of industry-level information in stock pricing.
Ranked by the importance of industry-
level information
Raw
Returns
Market-adjusted
Returns
Intercept of
CAPM
Intercept of three-
factor model
Daily covered
stocks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Long portfolios
P1 (least important) 0.0320** 0.0007 0.0030 0.0046 53.19
(2.18) (0.14) (0.56) (0.95)
P2 0.0310** 0.0002 0.0033 0.0070 52.22
(2.22) (0.04) (0.67) (1.49)
P3 0.0330** 0.0018 0.0026 0.0027 50.49
(2.19) (0.43) (0.61) (0.60)
P4 0.0386*** 0.0073 0.0090* 0.0097** 48.69
(2.61) (1.65) (1.97) (2.02)
P5 (most important) 0.0332** 0.0019 0.0018 0.0005 43.52
(2.04) (0.30) (0.27) (0.08)
P1–P5 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0041
p = 95.7% p = 88.5% p = 88.0% p = 62.7%
Panel B: Short portfolios
P1 (least important) 0.0001 0.0311*** 0.0320*** 0.0335*** 12.18
(0.01) (3.52) (3.49) (3.45)
P2 0.0065 0.0248*** 0.0272*** 0.0302*** 13.22
(0.37) (3.42) (3.64) (4.00)
P3 0.0199 0.0114 0.0121 0.0194** 14.71
(1.14) (1.34) (1.37) (2.35)
P4 0.0125 0.0188*** 0.0200*** 0.0256*** 16.33
(0.75) (3.05) (3.14) (4.46)
P5 (most important) 0.0212 0.0101* 0.0098 0.0149*** 19.64
(1.33) (1.73) (1.62) (2.86)
P1–P5 0.0210 0.0210** 0.0222** 0.0186*
p = 37.8% p = 4.9% p = 3.8% p = 6.7%
Panel C: Hedge portfolios
P1 (least important) 0.0319*** 0.0350*** 0.0381***
(3.11) (3.31) (3.51)
P2 0.0246*** 0.0305*** 0.0372***
(2.77) (3.40) (4.18)
P3 0.0132 0.0147 0.0221**
(1.40) (1.50) (2.35)
P4 0.0261*** 0.0290*** 0.0354***
(3.44) (3.70) (4.72)
P5 (most important) 0.0120 0.0116 0.0154*
(1.40) (1.29) (1.78)
P1–P5 0.0199 0.0234* 0.0227*
p = 13.6% p = 7.8% p = 8.5%
Note: We deﬁne the percentage of the variation in ﬁrms’ stock returns explained by industry-level information as the diﬀerence in R2
between models (3) and (4) during the T  60 to T  1 period, and classify all ﬁrms with consensus recommendations into one of ﬁve
groups. For each group, we purchase stocks in the portfolio with consensus recommendations no higher than 2, and sell short stocks in the
portfolio with consensus recommendations higher than 2.5, while the stocks with consensus recommendations between 2 and 2.5 are
excluded (Barber et al., 2001; Loh and Mian, 2006). We estimate portfolio abnormal returns using market-adjusted returns, the intercept
of the CAPM and the intercept of Fama-French three-factor model, respectively. ***, ** and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses.
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is unrelated to the importance of industry-level information in stock pricing.
Table 14 reports the estimated coeﬃcients for the Fama-French three-factor model. The coeﬃcients on
RMRF, SMB and HML indicate that both the market risk and book-to-market ratios show no signiﬁcant
Table 14
Fama-French three-factor model regressions based on analysts’ consensus recommendations portfolios by the importance of industry-level
information in stock pricing.
Ranked by the importance of industry-level information Coeﬃcient estimates for the three-factor model Adj-R2 N
RMRF SMB HML
Panel A: Long portfolios
P1 (least important) 0.9621*** 0.3204*** 0.4227*** 90.60 60
(23.03) (3.38) (2.73)
P2 0.8897*** 0.3470*** 0.1137 90.39 60
(22.12) (3.80) (0.76)
P3 0.9871*** 0.0941 0.2028 92.56 60
(25.85) (1.09) (1.43)
P4 0.9295*** 0.0154 0.1053 90.93 60
(22.54) (0.16) (0.69)
P5 (most important) 0.9829*** 0.1685 0.1571 84.67 60
(84.67) (1.26) (0.72)
Panel B: Short portfolios
P1 (least important) 1.0161*** 0.1482 0.0740 74.31 60
(12.20) (0.78) (0.24)
P2 1.0504*** 0.3420** 0.2322 84.38 60
(16.22) (2.33) (0.97)
P3 1.0007*** 0.6483*** 0.1394 80.85 60
(14.09) (4.02) (0.53)
P4 1.0167*** 0.5233*** 0.1694 89.90 60
(20.60) (4.67) (0.92)
P5 (most important) 0.9522*** 0.5370*** 0.3026* 90.85 60
(21.33) (5.30) (1.83)
Panel C: Hedge portfolios
P1 (least important) 0.0540 0.4686** 0.4967 2.90 120
(0.58) (2.22) (1.44)
P2 0.1607** 0.6890*** 0.3459 3.77 120
(2.11) (3.98) (1.22)
P3 0.0137 0.7423*** 0.3422 2.41 120
(0.17) (4.06) (1.14)
P4 0.0872 0.5386*** 0.0641 2.46 120
(1.36) (3.69) (0.27)
P5 (most important) 0.0307 0.3685** 0.1455 0.76 120
(0.41) (2.19) (0.53)
Note: Following Fama (1998), we deﬁne RMRF as value-weighted market returns minus the risk-free rate; SMB as the diﬀerence between
the daily returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks and one of large stocks; andHML as the diﬀerence between the daily returns
of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks. ***, ** and * represent signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses.
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ﬁndings in Table 12.
As a further robustness test, we examine the abnormal returns for portfolios formed on the basis of ana-
lysts’ consensus recommendations during the T  90 to T  1 period (i.e. X = 90) and the T  180 to T  1
period (i.e. X = 180), respectively. The results are consistent.
Overall, the empirical results in Section 4.4 show that (1) analysts’ recommendations are valuable; (2) the
investment value of recommendations increases as ﬁrm-speciﬁc information becomes more important in stock
pricing, while there is no signiﬁcant relationship between the investment value of recommendations and the
importance of industry-level information; (3) the duration of the investment value is quite short (usually a cou-
ple of days) when it comes to favorable recommendations; and (4) the duration of the investment value is
much longer (usually several months) when it comes to unfavorable recommendations, which may be due
to short-sale constraints and analyst optimism.
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ﬁrm-speciﬁc information than industry-level information. On the one hand, analysts’ research reports increase
the ability of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information to explain the variation in stock returns, while on the other hand, cov-
ering more ﬁrms in the same industry does not help analysts incorporate industry-level information into their
research reports and thus improve the investment value of their recommendations. (2) As expected, the invest-
ment value of analysts’ recommendations increases as ﬁrm-speciﬁc information becomes more important in
stock pricing, which conﬁrms the analysts’ superiority.
5. Conclusion and limitations
5.1. Conclusion and implications
With the development of the Chinese capital market, the securities analyst industry is growing rapidly.
Whether analysts’ activities help to decrease information asymmetry and thus improve the eﬃciency of
resource allocation in the capital market has caused great concern among academics and practitioners.
However, the ﬁndings in the literature are controversial. Our study explores this debate and provides a new
form of evidence.
Using data on 192,012 recommendations issued by Chinese security analysts from 2005 to 2010, we ﬁnd
that on the whole, analysts are better at analyzing and transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc than industry-level informa-
tion. Speciﬁcally, ceteris paribus, analysts’ research reports increase the ability of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information to
explain the variation in stock returns. Furthermore, covering more ﬁrms in the same industry does not help
analysts to incorporate industry-level information into their research reports and thus improve the investment
value of their recommendations. The investment value of analysts’ recommendations increases as ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information plays a more important role in stock pricing, which also conﬁrms that analysts are good at ana-
lyzing and transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc information. Our empirical results suggest that security analysts play an
important role in alleviating the information asymmetry in the capital market and that their research reports
can guide investors. Our ﬁndings also show that the investment value of analysts’ recommendations is mainly
derived from their research activities of analyzing and transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc rather than industry-level
information.
The results of this study also generate some important implications. First, the securities analyst industry
should further enhance its ability to process industry-level information, so that it may play a more important
role in alleviating the information asymmetry arising from industry-level information. Second, listed
companies should further improve their information disclosure environment. Our ﬁndings suggest that the
investment value of analysts’ research reports increases as ﬁrm-speciﬁc information becomes more important
in stock pricing, which means that ﬁrm-speciﬁc information is not well understood by investors, thus resulting
in the demand for information from intermediaries. Once the information environment of listed companies
improves at the institutional level, a huge amount of transaction costs will be saved.
5.2. Limitations
First, our study shows that security analysts’ superiority lies in analyzing and transferring ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information, which ignores the fact that some analysts are good at processing industry-level information.
Unfortunately, this paper does not distinguish between analysts who are good at processing industry-level
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc information.
Second, the descriptive statistics in Section 4 show that security analysts tend to be optimistic. Although we
follow Loh and Mian’s (2006) method to construct our portfolios, it is still possible that the reliability of our
conclusions is aﬀected by analyst optimism.4 Therefore, readers should be aware that some limitations exist in
the reliability of our conclusions. We look forward to more academic research based on mature data in the
future.4 We thank the referee for pointing this out.
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